The costs of break-up
The aftermath of disaster is all the more frightening for being incalculable
Sep 17th 2011 | from the print edition
THE costs of efforts to save the euro are justified by the claim that the alternative would be too dreadful to contemplate. But economic history is littered with examples of fixed exchange rates that came unfixed; the disuniting of currency unions, though rarer, happens from time to time. So how do the costs of sustaining the euro compare with the costs of its falling apart?
The question does not have a simple answer. For a start, there are lots of different ways to fall apart: a wholesale dissolution into the original currencies; a fissioning into northern hard-currency and southern soft-currency blocks; or the exit of a trickle of countries, or just one. Further complexities come from the panoply of choices the departing and remaining states would make after the fall. And all this turns as much or more on law and politics as on economics.
Take two specific scenarios. Germany could leave, either on its own or with a select group of small economies—Austria, Finland and the Netherlands—as recently suggested by Hans-Olaf Henkel, a former head of the Federation of German Industries. Second, and more likely, Greece might secede or be forced out.
In each instance, the economic consequences could be devastating, argue many analysts. If Germany were to leave, its Neue Deutschmark would soar as international funk money piled into a bigger, better Switzerland, and German manufacturing firms would suffer. German banks could cope with the switch of domestic deposits and loans into the new currency, but they would have to be recapitalised because their foreign assets in euros would now be worth less in domestic terms.
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